Abstract. This paper examines the controllability of dynamic oligopoly models. Both discrete and continuous time scales are considered, and sufficient and necessary conditions are derived for the complete controllability of the outputs of the fims.
I. INTRODUCTION
Oligopoly models are the most intensively investigated economic games. The existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibria is the central problem in static oligoplies, and the asymptotical behavior of the equilibium is investigated by many authors in the dynamic case. A comprehensive summary of earlier results on single-product models is given in Okuguchi (1976) , and their generalizations to multi-product firms are discussed in Okuguchi and Szidarovszky (1999) , where the different variants of oligopoly models are also intoduced and examined. The classical Cournot model can be formuled as follows. Assumes that n firms produce the same product and/or offer identical services in the same market. Let x k be the production output of firm k, c k (x k ) its cost function, and let ) ( In the case of oligopolies with product differentiation we assume that the firms produce different items (or offer different services), and the price of each prodct (or service) depends on the outputs of all firms: f k (x 1 , x 2 , … , x n ), so the profit of firm k is now given as
In the case of labor-manages oligopies assume that w is the competitive wage rate and c k (x k ) is the laborindependent production cost. If h k (x k ) is the amount of labor needed for output x k , then the profit of firm k per labor is
In the case of rent-seeking games we assume that n agents compete for a rent. Let x k denote the effort of agent k, and c k (x k ) be his cost function, and assume that the probability of winning the rent is
which provides a profit of P$ to the agent who actually wins the rent, Then the expected profit of agent k is
The multi-product extensions of there models are straightforward, the output of each firm is a production vector, and the unit price function is replaced by a price vector.
The actual forms of the payoff functions are similar to the single-product case. In this paper we asumed that tha market is controlled by a central (e.g. government) agency via subsidies, tax cuts, etc. We will examine the complete controllabilty of the resulting dynamic systems. 
II. THE CONTROL MODELS
where u is the control variable affecting unit production costs. Other types of controls can be examined in a similar way.
In developing the relevant dynamic models assume first that the time scale is discrete. At each time period each firm maximizes its predicted profit functions
where we assume that each firm expects all rivals to produce the same output as they produced in the previous time period. This type of expectations is called static in the economic literature. Other types of expectations such as adaptive extrapolative, and delayed can be examined in a similar way. It is also assumed that each firm selects the profit maximizing output of each time period. Assuming that it is positive, simple differentiation shows that
We can rewrite these equations into the usual systems form by introducing the new state variables
This is a linear system with 
where S k > 0 is given speed of adjustment of firm k. Notice that
with S=diag(S 1 , S 2 , … , S n ).
If the firms are controlled diferently, then the cost term in equation (11) is c k u k instead of c k u , and therefore the system coefficient are ( ). Assume next that n = 3. We will show that the rank of matrix K is always less than n. Observe first that ), ( 2
where I is the n x n identity matrix and E is the n x n matrix with all elements equal unity. Since E² = n E, (16) Hence the columns of K are linearly dependent, therefore rank ( K) < n so the system is not completely controllable,
We will next show that system (10), when different firms may be controlled differently, is always completely controllable.
Theorem 2.
System (10) is always completely controllable for all n = 2 and arbitrary positive constants A and c k ( k = 1, 2, …, n).
Proof.
In this case the Kalman contollability matrix is the following :
Observe that B is a diagonal matrix with nonzero diagonal elements, so the columns of B are linearly independent. Therefore tha rank of K is at least n, and since it has only n rows, rank(K) = n.
Lets turn our attention next to the continous time scales models. System (11) 
It is very difficult to see a simple condition in the general case, therefore two important special cases will be discussed.
Theorem 3. (i)
In the case of n = 2, system (11) is completely controllable if and only if
Assume that S 1 = S 2 = … = S n and n = 3. Then system (11) is not completely controllable.
Proof (i)
Assume first that n = 2 then, where B = diag (-S 1 c 1 , -S 2 c 2 , … , -S n c n ) with linearly independent columns. Therefore rank (K) = n, and hence we have the following result:
Theorem 4.
Assume that in the case of continuous time scales different firms maybe controlled differently. Then the resulting dynamic system is always completely controllable.
In the above results only the classical single-product Cournot model without profit differentation was considered, and only static expectations were assumed. Other kinds of expectations and other model varriants can be investigated in an analogous manner. Their controllablity properties will be discussed in a future paper.
